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TRINE: EFFECT OF "UNLAWFULNESS OF THE
ACT" ON LIABILITY FOR MANSLAUGHTER
Under the statutes of the several states, involuntary man-
slaughter is variously defined, but the meanings seem to be sub-
stantially the same as that of the common law definition. The crime,
as defined by the common law, is the unintentional killing of another
occasioned by a person engaged at the time in doing some unlawful
act not amounting to a felony and not likely to endanger life, or en-
gaged in the doing of a lawful act in an unlawful manner.1
Although the inference may be gathered from the common law
rule that a homicide committed by one engaged at the time in an un-
lawful act amounting to a misdemeanor is never excusable, the law
is neither that strict nor that simple; and adequate defenses to a mis-
demeanor-manslaughter charge may be predicated upon (1) the
nature of the unlawful act and (2) the absence of a causal relation
between the death and the unlawful act.
The degree of unlawfulness of the act that the wrongdoer was
engaged in at the time the killing occurred is usually said to be de-
terminative of the grade of homicide, and is the basis of the modern
felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrines At the
common law the unlawful act relied upon to render the accompany-
ing death manslaughter should be less than a felony; however, sev-
eral of the states have passed statutes which more explicitly define
the boundary between murder and manslaughter. Some of the
statutes name certain crimes and specify that if a death shall occur
collocatively thereto it shall be murder, otherwise it shall be man-
slaughter. A larger number of the statutes place the line of demar-
cation between murder and manslaughter upon the distinction be-
tween felony and misdemeanor.
In those jurisdictions that do not follow the strict misdemeanor-
manslaughter doctrine, misdemeanors are generally divided into
two classes: (1) acts mala in se and (2) acts mala prohibita. In such
jurisdictions most authorities agree that the degree or nature of the
unlawfulness of the act necessary to sustain a conviction of involun-
tary manslaughter must amount to an act malum in se as contrasted
'Common-,vealth v. Couch, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 638, 106 S.W 830
(1908), Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7, 285 S.W 565 (1926), State v
Weisengoff, 85 W Va. 271, 101 S.E. 450 (1919)
Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Un-
lawful Act, 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 811 (1939)
L.J.-9
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to one merely malum prohibitum. An act malum in se, according to
one writer, is an offense which " mischievously affects the person
or property of another, or openly outrages decency, or disturbs
public order, or is injurious to public morals, or is in breach of offi-
cial duty when done corruptly " The court in Commonwealth v
Adams4 suggested that the only things which may be termed mala
prohibita are those acts or omissions forbidden by statute, but not
otherwise wrong. Another court has said that definitions of this
nature cause a fallacious impression to be obtained that only acts
can be classified as mala in se which the common law makes criminal
but that this is not the test. Therefore, it may be readily seen, due
to the diversity of opimon as to what is malum in se and what is
malum prohibitum, that there can be no uniformity of conviction in
the various courts where a killing occurs collocatively to the com-
mission of some misdemeanor.
After it has been determined that the defendant committed an
unlawful act, the nature of which is sufficient to sustain a man-
slaughter conviction, it is still necessary to ascertain whether a
causal relation exists between the death and the unlawful act. That
mere coincidence in time or place is insufficient is aptly shown in
the following case: A policeman, while committing an offense
malum in se by failing to arrest certain persons, accidentally killed a
girl. His conviction of involuntary manslaughter was reversed be-
cause of the absence of a causal relation between the death and the
unlawful act.0 However, some of the courts plainly ignore the causal
relation between the death and the unlawful act which should be a
prerequisite to conviction and adhere blindly to the rule that a kill-
ing by one engaged at the time in an unlawful act is manslaughter.
The felony-murder doctrine, a parallel development to the mis-
demeanor-manslaughter doctrine, can be traced back beyond the
time of Coke, and although some of the more recent writers have
incorporated the doctrine in their treatises on criminal law, they are
highly critical of it. Judge Stephen, in the case of Regina v. Serne,
was successful m eliminating the felony-murder doctrine in England
almost sixty-one years ago; however, the rule remains in force in the
majority of the jurisdictions of the United States? The misdemeanor-
manslaughter doctrine is just as fallacious as the felony-murder
doctrine and may be subjected to practically the same criticisms.
The following rule is thought to be a more logical and practical basis
for solving the cases: Homicide is manslaughter if the death ensues
2 1 WHARTON, A TREATISE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 3 (6th ed. 1868).
'Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873).
5State v Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945 (1905)
0 People v Mulcahy, 318 Ill. 332, 149 N.E. 266 (1925).
-Keller v State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W 803 (1927).
16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887).
'Note, 36 Ky. L.J. 106 (1947)
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as the consequence of the perpetration of a misdemeanor or other
unlawful act, more than ordinarily dangerous to human life and
safety
Those who have never paused to consider the common law rule
and its ramifications may remonstrate that the above proposal is
lacking in precedent and that its adoption would cause an atomic
change in what is otherwise a settled field of the law; but for those,
some of the older authorities provide an answer. Russell cites a case
where a gentleman came to town in a chaise, and before he got out,
fired his pistols into the ground, accidentally killing a woman. He
was convicted of manslaughter because the act was likely to breed
danger and was manifestly improper. Since such terminology is
seen in practically all the old treatises, it is perceptible that the
authors were cognizant of the test of dangerousness, but because
the old common lawv test of unlawfulness of the act was so deeply
ensconced in the law, an inhibition was placed on those writers;
hence, the antiquated rule was enunciated despite its anachronisms.
Another writer, Bevill, who stolidly recapitulated the law of
homicide in his volume, said, "When a man in doing any act which
is unlawful and malum in se, by accident kill any person, and there
is no probability that it will occasion death or a personal injury to
anyone, it is manslaughter."' This statement of the law, made in
1799, accurately depicts the status of the present law, and probably
because of its hoary age remains unscathed. In other words, the
jurists of England thought that if the unlawful act was dangerous
the accused was guilty of murder, and they had a quasi-logical
reason for so thinking. In England, where the original felony-
murder doctrine (and the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine) was
devised, it made no difference whether the defendant was convicted
for the unlawful act or the homicide, because, in either case, he
suffered a serious penalty-usually decapitation-and as a man can
tolerate his head to be severed only once, the unlawful act and the
homicide were combined.' Therefore, those who have a great abhor-
rence of constructive crime should bestow their vehemence upon the
English rather than the American Courts. But since penalties are
not now so serious and the modern concept of punishment is to act
as a deterrent as well as retribution, the basic concept of construc-
tive crime should be examined to determine if there is sufficient
reason to retain it in all its severity. Although the courts perfunctor-
ily recite the rule that one is guilty of manslaughter if he kills
another while doing an unlawful nonfelonious act not likely to en-
10 1 RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 636 (7th
ed. 1853).
1 BEVILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HoMICIDE, AND OF LARCENY
AT COMMON LAW 55 (1799).
'In Blackstone's time approximately 120 offenses were pun-
ishable by death. Commonwealth v Sampson, 130 Pa. Super. 65, -,
196 AtI. 564, 567 (1938).
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danger life, do they really mean what they say' If such a statement
clearly expresses their view, it would seem that the accused is being
punished for the unlawful act rather than the homicide. There is no
valid reason for doing this in the form of a prosecution for homicide
when all jurisdictions provide adequate recourse against an erring
citizen who commits either a felony or a misdemeanor.
Some of the courts, when a case arises where conviction is not
advisable, rather than apply the rule "not likely to endanger life"
and all the inflexibility and harshness inherent therein, seek a loop-
hole in order to excuse the defendant-generally remoteness, i.e., the
absence of a causal relation between the death and the unlawful act.Y
Of course, remoteness is an adequate defense, but to use the theory to
masquerade priactically all acquittals is absurd. In this connection,
the two following cases, which demonstrate the problem of deter-
mining causal relation, should be studied: A husband was held
guilty of manslaughter, in the lower court, for so frightening his wife
that she left home, thinly clad on a very cold night, and died of
exposure.' In still another case, the defendant unlawfully fired at
random in the highway, and so frightened an enceinte woman that
she had a miscarriage and died. The court held that the death was
not the natural and probable consequence of the shooting and ac-
quitted the accused of the manslaughter charge.' In both cases it is
possible to conclude that an intervening factor caused the death, and
m that event, the results are not harmonious. In practically all the
cases, causation could be utilized in order to attain the desired re-
sult, but why resort to such an intangible method in order to secure
an acquittal' Why not say that under the circumstances the act is
not sufficiently dangerous to life to warrant conviction?
Several of the courts, however, have reached a gratifying con-
clusion without mobilizing fiction and have used the proper termi-
nology in so doing. One court, in reaction to a factual situation
wherein the defendant unlawfully sold the deceased whiskey, the
drinking of which, followed by exposure, caused his death, said,
"Notwithstanding the fact that the statute has declared it to be a
felony, it is an act not in itself directly and naturally dangerous to
life. So if one in the commission of such an act unintentionally
causes the death of another, he is not guilty of murder, nor is he
guilty of manslaughter unless he commits the act carelessly and
in such a manner as manifests a reckless disregard of human life."'"
Definitely this case satisfies all the requirements of the common law
definition of manslaughter since the killing resulted from an unlaw-
ful act not likely to endanger life, but it is thought that no prudent
I3 Compare Hubbard v Commonwealth, 304 Ky 818, 202 S.W 2d
634 (1947), with Letner v. State, 156 Tenn. 68, 299 S.W 1049 (1927).
'Hendrickson v Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 281, 3 S.W 166 (1887)
1 Commonwealth v Couch, 32 Ky L. Rep. 638, 106 S.W 830
(1908).
"
6 People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, -, 199 N.W 373, 374 (1924).
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court would have convicted in this situation. If the courts adhered
to the rule as it is recited, conviction would necessarily follow in
such a case, but the theory of remoteness may be and ordinarily is
used to defeat conviction. Dicta of cases decided in Mississippi"7 and
Pennsylvania' follow the language of the above case, and if they
have not already changed their position, those jurisdictions have an
excellent opportunity to do so by virtue of the transitory language
contained therein.
Furthermore, the attendant difficulties in determining whether
a misdemeanor is malurm zn se or merely malum prohibitum, in those
jurisdictions that make the distinction, would be obviated by using
the test of dangerousness. Those courts that do not observe the dis-
tinction between misdemeanors but follow the strict misdemeanor-
manslaughter doctrine' have disposed of the difficulty, but they are
more harsh in their treatment of offenders. But in either event, the
fact that the unlawful act was a felony, or a misdemeanor malum ?n
se, or a misdemeanor malum prohibitum may be one of the circum-
stances to be considered in determining whether the act was suffi-
ciently dangerous to support a conviction for homicide. It is not,
however, the controlling circumstance as under the present status of
the law. Moreover, the malum zn se and malum prohibitum test to
determine whether the unlawful act satisfies the requsites of the
rule is not founded upon sound principle, " for it is equally unfit,
that a man should be allowed to take advantage of what the law
says he ought not to do, whether the thing be prohibited, because
it is against good morals, or whether it be prohibited because it is
in the interest of the state."'
Of course, the courts that contend that they follow the common
law rule do not exact penalties in accordance with the rigid in-
flexibility thereof, in view of the fact that a stratagem will present
itself upon vigilant search; but why should a modern court dogmat-
ically insist that it is following a certain rule but yet find a loophole
when the circumstances so warrant? All that is necessary to be done
is to formulate a more elastic rule that will take care of the cases.
The jurists who have a phobia against deviating from the hallowed
common law will immediately insist that one should never sacrifice
a clear, impeccable rule for what they term a vague generality; but
if a rule will allow each criminal case to stand on its facts and each
circumstance to speak for itself, certainly justice can be more nearly
perfected by individualizing each case, rather than coldly saying,
"You killed a man while committing a felony; your punishment
"
7 See Dixon v. State, 104 Miss. 410, -, 61 So. 423, 423 (1913).
' See Commonwealth v. Sampson, 130 Pa. Super. 65, -, 196 Atl.
564, 567 (1938).
' Thompson v. State, 131 Ala. 18, 31 So. 725 (1902), Sparks v
Com., 3 Bush 111 (Ky. 1867), Brittain v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 406,
37 S.W 758 (1896).
:Note, 21 CAN. B. REv. 503, 505 (1943).
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shall be life imprisonment or death," or "You committed a homicide
while doing a misdemeanor; you are guilty of manslaughter." For
example, one may find a felony which is no more serious than a
misdemeanor malum sn se committed under aggravating circum-
stances, yet the punishment in the former is far excessive of the
latter. Certainty in the law should be of prime importance in com-
mercial and property law and perhaps other phases of the civil law,
but criminal law should attempt to extol justice rather than cer-
tainty; and hence, "hard and fast rules" should be secondary
As has been previously shown, the common law rule, although
repeatedly cited, is not strictly followed because of the courts' pro-
pensity to use some device when an acquittal is desired, whereas it
would be tantamount to conviction to follow the old rule; but why
should one's actions be disguised when the same thing that is being
done indirectly may be done directly merely by an assertion that
the offense shall depend upon the dangerousness of the act rather
than the unlawfulness thereof? Although the majority of the cases
are opposed to the proposed rule, reason should be substituted for
number and the law of constructive crime examined to determine if
the welfare of society is being adequately protected by the law as
written in Coke's era.
It is submitted, therefore, that for the ancient misdemeanor-
manslaughter rule there should be substituted the more rational and
direct test of whether the act is more than ordinarily dangerous to
human life and safety in determining whether a defendant is guilty
of manslaughter in homicide cases coming within this category.
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